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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah

FRANK BAINE,
Plainti.f.f and Appellant,

Case No.
9049

GEORGE BECKSTEAD, Sheriff of
Salt Lake County,
Defendant and Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND BRIEF
The appellant hereby petitions the court for a rehear~
ing in the above entitled cause, and assigns therefor, the
following point-s;
L Error of the court in holding that appellant pleaded
guilty to the crime of issuing a check against insufficient
funds.
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2. Error of the court in holding that on March 27,
1959, appellant had a hearing at which he was sworn and
testified against himself.

Respectfully submitted,
D. H. OLIVER,

Attorney for Appellant.
138 South 2nd East,
Salt Lake City, Utah.

BRIEF
To sustain this petition appellant relies on the followmg:

STATEMENT OF POINT

POINT I.
NO STATE SHALL DENY TO ANY PERSON
WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION THE EQL'AL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
U. S. Constitution, Amendment 14 Sec. 1,
Sees. 77-51-3 and 77-51-4, utah Code 1953,
Barnes vs. District Court, 104 P. 282, 16 C. ,J.
449,
State vs. Bonza, 150 P. 2nd 970,
Christiansen vs. HarrW, 163 P. 2nd 314,
Darnell vs. Haines, 203 P. 712.
STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 75 (h) it is stipulated that the
Supplemental record, consisting of Pages 1 to 7, may i>e,
and is, filed as part of the record on this appeal.
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In paragraphs 1 and 2 of appellant's petition (R. 1),
it is alleged that appellant is unlawfully restrained of his
liberty, in that on or about March 14, 1958, he wa~ convicted
and sentenced to prison and then placed on probation. The
respondent admitted these allegations (R. 4). In its opinion, this court said that appellant pleaded guilty to the
offense charged, and for this reason the verdict of the jury,
(S. R. 1), is submitted to correct that error.
This court also states that appellant Wstified that on
March 27, he was sworn and testified. This statement is
erroneous and for this reason the record of what transpired
on that date is submitted to the court for clarification (S.
R. 6-7).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

NO STATE SHALL DENY TO ANY PERSON
WITHIN ITS JL'RISDICTION THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

Whether or not the appeilant pleaded guilty or was
convicted of the offense of issuing a check against insufficient funds, we think, is immaterial to the issue involved
on this appeal, hut since the court seems to have placed some
credence on that fact, we have submitted the verdict of the
jury, for the scrutiny of the court, (S. R. 1).
The principle herein contended for is set forth in appellant's original brief on file herein, and which is made a
part hereof by reference thereto.
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In addition to violating the due process clauses therein
set forth the appellant contends that under the majority
opinion written in this cause he is denied the equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
This court seems to adhere to the principle laid down
in the Zolantakis case, decided several years ago, and
wherein the rule was spelled out in the Bonza case by the
unanimous opinion of this court, as follows:
"Where the commission of a sub.sequent offense
is made the basis of an application for termination
of probation, and a complaint or information hru;
been lodged charging probationer with its commission, action by the prubation court may well abide
the determination of his guilt or innocence in the
court before which the prosecution is conducted."
In approving this rule this court narrowed the application thereof as follows:
"However, if there is dispute about the accusation upon which the revocation is based, and concerning which reasonable minds might differ, a
hearing and inquiry into the matter should be held."
This court refers to Chi'istiansctl vs. Harris, as illustrative of the application of this rule wherein, it was held
that under the circumstances in that case a hearing was
not required. In the Clm'sfians(;/ case the probationer appeared in court on his regular reporting day and made confessions as follows: ( 1) That he had pleaded guilty to intoxication, (2) That he had knowingb· issued several checks
without funds, (3) That he had never lived up to the expectations of the court, himself, and everyone else, and (4}
I have not lived up torn~· promise.
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In the instant case appellant's conduct had been exemplary, except on one instant when he was accused of
assaulting one Earlene Kennon with a deadly weapon, a
charge about which reasonable minds may differ. At the
present time there is not one scintilla of evidence in the
entire record which even indicates what the facts were in
regard to the alleged assault and in this respect, if the facts
were known, it may be debatable as to whether or not an
assault of any kind was made.
The order to show cause was returnable March 16,
1959, (Ex. 2), at \Yhich time appellant appeared in person
and by counsel and, upon motion of appellant, the matter
was continued to March 25 (S. R. 2). On March 25, the
order to show cause was dismissed, (see stipulation R. 14
and S. R. 3).
The appellant appeared in court on March 27, and
upon being asked by the court if he had had ~orne difficulty
with his probation and the law, the appellant answered, (not
under oath), "yes" (S. R. 6). The word difficulty, in and of
itself, does not imply crime and where one's liberty is at
stake it certainly should not be construed to mean crime.
During the inquiry the appellant told the court he had had a
rnisunderstr;..nding with Miss Kennon ( S. R. 6). By no stretch
of the ima!{ination can the word misunderstanding imply
crime. And under our American system of jurisprudence the
filing of a complaint charging a person with crime iH no evidence that the person accused is guilty. Koone appeared at
this purported hearing to testify as to what the appellant actually did on the occasion in question, and for this reason
there wa~ no evidence whatsoever that appellant had violated his probation.
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This brings us to the fundamental problem presented
by the facts of record, namely, First, what effect did the
dismissal of the order t{) show cause have on the status of
the proceedings on :illar~h 25 7 Second, what effect did that
dismissal have on the appellant? and Third, may the state
lull a probationer into a feeling of security and then, without notice and an opportunity to defend, take advantage of
him?
In answer to the first inquiry, Sec. 77-51-4 of the Utah

Code, provides:
"The court may, either on its own motion or
upon the application of the District Attorney, in
furtherance of justice, order an action, information
or indictment to be dismissed. The reason for the
dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon
the minutes."
And Sec. 77-51-3 provides:
"If the court directs the action to be dismissed,
the defendant must, if in custody, be discharged
therefrom; or if admitted to bail, his bail shall be
exonerated, or money deposited instead of bail must
be refunded to him."
In B~rnes vs. DWtrict Crmrt. this court construed the
effects of these statutes with the following language:
"True, snch a dismissal and discharge might
not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense. But that is another thing. When the action
was dismissed, and the defendant discharged and
sent out of court, that put an end to that controversy."
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In construing the effect of a dismissal of a complaint
in a civil action the Supreme Court of Kansas in Darnell
vs. Haines, said,
"In our opw10n the appeal from the Probate
Court, gave the Dio;trict Court jurisdiction of the
entire proceedings, and the dismissal there left nothing pending in the Probate Court."
Thus it is clear that in both, criminal and civil actions, a
dismissal of any proceeding leaves nothing pending before
the court for consideration un the matter dismissed.
As to the second inquiry, the record shows that on
March 25, for good cause shown, (S. R. 3), the Order to
show Cause was dismissed and appellant left court feeling
that the matter had been disposed of; and it is the position
of appellant that he was justified in so thinking. This
brings us to inquiry (3), May the State, by positive and
affirmative action, mislead a defendant and his counsel by
inducing them to believe that the particular matter will
not be pursued any further, and then proceed, without notice, to have the same matter disposed of on the merits 1
In the footnote to 16 C. J. at page 449, we find this
language:
"A trial is a farce-indeed, and no trial at all,
if the defendant be not given an opportunity to prepare for trial-which is another way of saying an
opportunity to be heard. It is a mockery, solemnly,
to assure him that he has a right to defend by himself and by his witnesses; and then say to him, when,
in pursuance of the assurance, he demands his trial,
you shall not have an opportunity to prepare for
trial or to produce your witnesses. It goes without
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saying that the right to a trial without an opportunity to prepare for it is an idle a fatuous thing."

The record of March 27, (S. R. 7), indicates the predicament in which appellant found hii'Illlelf. The record
also indicates that the whole procedure was maskr-minded
by the State for the sole purpose of taking undue advantage
of appellant. And if this type of procedure is to be tolerated by this Court, then the door is open to greater mischief
than that discussed in its opinion in this case. Any disgruntled peri\on may file a complaint against any probationer; have the complaint dismissed, then have probation
revoked without probationer having a chance.
In this case the Respondent has stipulated that a rehearing may be had (see stipulation filed Dec. 21).
CO~CLUSION

We respectfully submit that the law as enunciated by
the Court in this case is sounder, more just and equitable
than that recommended by the minority opinion and, should
be sustained as the law of this state; and that the procedure
revealed by the record in this case shows a denial of the
protection that law offers to every individual, and thereore, sh ou ld b e reverse d~ <j.f (l_ t;:on'.pk:•tP rzy//ft;Yt
'
Respectfully submitted,
D. H. OLIVER,

Att01-ney for Appellant.
138 South 2nd East,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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